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Abstract—This survey paper, based on literature and 
discussions with nuclear stakeholders, identified cybersecurity 
standards for nuclear instrumentation and control 
architectures and systems. From among the identified 
standards, the most significant ones, namely IEC 62443 series, 
ISO 27K series, IEC 62645, IEC 62859 and IAEA’s NSS 17, 
were recognised and their main topics are further introduced. 
Additionally, it briefly discusses the importance and role of 
cybersecurity standards for the domain. 
Keywords—cybersecurity; industrial instrumentation and control 
systems; standards and frameworks 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Industrial cybersecurity is a domain governed by standards 
and guidance frameworks, which generally set forth techniques 
and methods to defend the cyber environment of the organization. 
Cybersecurity environment (sometimes referred as cyberspace) 
generally comprises of the humans (users), systems, components, 
software, services, processes and data connected directly or 
indirectly to networks. The goal of these frameworks and 
standards are to prevent and mitigate the cybersecurity threats and 
vulnerabilities, thus reducing cybersecurity risks. There are 
numerous standards and frameworks available, developed and 
published by various cybersecurity stakeholders, each one 
introducing their own, often unique, requirements, themes, topics 
and methods for securing systems and managing cybersecurity. 
Some of the concepts are shared between them, while some take 
different paths. This paper surveys and identifies the main 
cybersecurity standards for industrial control systems, more 
specifically focusing on nuclear instrumentation and control 
(I&C) cybersecurity from Finnish perspective. Special focus is on 
the relations between Finnish YVL-guides (regulatory standards) 
and other international standards (from IEC and ISO). 
Chapter II first identifies nuclear cybersecurity standards 
focusing on cybersecurity of industrial instrumentation and 
control systems in the design or operation phase. Then the most 
relevant standards from the Finnish perspective are recognised. 
Finally Chapter II gives an introduction to each most relevant 
cybersecurity standards identified, where their main topics are 
presented from I&C point of view. Chapter III includes brief 
discussion and the conclusions from the work. 
II. CYBERSECURITY REQUIREMENTS AND STANDARDS 
A. Survey of cybersecurity standards 
Literature and web was surveyed for relevant cybersecurity 
standards. The survey was mainly based on author’s previous 
knowledge of the domain, as well as exploring publishers’ 
databases (e.g. IEC/ISO databases) and other cybersecurity survey 
papers (such as [1], [2], [3], [4]). No exact match for the goal of 
this research was found from the literature, which would concern 
cybersecurity standards for nuclear I&C.  
The following list presents the results for the cybersecurity 
standard survey for nuclear I&C systems and architecture. The 
gathered list is quite broad as our scope was to gather quite 
extensively all the main standards guiding the cybersecurity 
design of nuclear power plant. Thus, the list covers large range of 
design domains and categories from security management, IT and 
OT, architecture to system and to component design. The list was 
presented and discussed with Finnish nuclear stakeholders 
(STUK, the Finnish regulator, Fennovoima and TVO, two Finnish 
licence-holders) and accordingly it is expected to present quite a 
comprehensive list of cybersecurity standards in the domain from 
Finnish perspective. However, it is possibly that the survey has 
missing some.  
ISO/IEC Security Standards 
Generic 
− ISO/IEC 13335-1 Information technology – Guidelines for the 
management of information technology security 
− ISO/IEC 15408 series Information technology – Security 
techniques – Evaluation criteria for IT security 
− ISO/IEC 27000 series Information technology – Security 
techniques – Information security management systems 
− IEC 60870 series Telecontrol equipment and systems 
− IEC 61850 Communication networks and systems for power 
utility automation 
− IEC 62443 series Industrial communication networks – IT 
security for networks and systems  
− IEC/TR 63069 Industrial-process measurement, control and 
automation - Framework for functional safety and security 
− IEC TR 63074 Safety of machinery - Security aspects related 
to functional safety of safety-related control systems 
− IEC 62351 series Power systems management and associated 
information exchange - Data and communications security 
Nuclear specific 
− IEC 60880 Nuclear Power Plants – Instrumentation and control 
systems important to safety – Software aspects for computer-
based systems performing category A functions 
− IEC 61500 Nuclear Power Plants – Instrumentation and control 
systems important to safety – Data communication in systems 
performing category A functions 
− IEC 61513 Nuclear Power Plants – Implementation and control 
systems important to safety – General requirements for systems 
− IEC 62138 Nuclear Power Plants – Instrumentation and control 
systems important to safety – Software aspects for computer-
based systems performing category B or C functions 
− IEC 62645 Nuclear Power Plants – Instrumentation, control 
and electrical power systems – Cybersecurity requirements 
− IEC 62859 Nuclear Power Plants – Instrumentation and control 
systems – Requirements for coordinating safety and 
cybersecurity 
− IEC 62988 Nuclear Power Plants – Instrumentation and control 
systems important to safety – Selection and use of wireless 
devices 
− IEC 63096 Nuclear Power Plants – Instrumentation, control 
and electrical power systems – Security controls 
IAEA Security Standards/Guides 
− IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 7 Nuclear Security Culture 
− IAEA Nuclear Security Series No.8 Rev.1   Preventive and 
Protective Measures against Insider Threats 
− IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 10 Development, Use and 
Maintenance of the Design Basis Threat 
− IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 17 Computer Security at 
Nuclear Facilities 
− IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 23-G Security of Nuclear 
Information 
− IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 33-T Computer Security of 
Instrumentation and Control System at Nuclear Facilities 
− IAEA Computer Security for Nuclear Security 
− IAEA Computer Security Techniques for Nuclear Facilities 
− IAEA Computer Security of I&C Systems at Nuclear Facilities 
− IAEA Conducting Computer Security Assessments 
− IAEA Computer Security Incident Response 
− IAEA Computer Security during the Lifetime of a Nuclear 
Facility 
− IAEA, INSAG-24, The interface between safety and security at 
nuclear power plants 
IEEE Security Standards 
− IEEE 7-4.3.2-2016: Standard Criteria for Programmable 
Digital Devices in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power 
Generating Stations 
− IEEE 1686-2013: Standard for Intelligent Electronic Devices 
(IEDs) Cyber Security Capabilities 
NIST Cybersecurity Framework 
− NIST Special Publication 800-82 Rev 2: Guide to Industrial 
Control Systems (ICS) Security 
− NIST Special Publication 800-30: Risk Management Guide for 
Information Technology Systems 
− NIST Special Publication 800-53A Rev 1: Guide for Assessing 
the Security Controls in Federal Information Systems in 
Organizations 
− NIST Special Publication 800-53 Rev 3: Recommended 
Security Controls for Federal Information Systems and 
Organizations 
Other 
− NRC Regulatory Guide (RG) 5.71: Cyber Security Programs 
for Nuclear Facilities 
− NRC Regulatory Guide (RG) 73.54: Protection of Digital 
Computer and Communication Systems and Networks 
− NRC Regulatory Guide (RG) 5.83: Cyber Security Event 
Notifications 
− NRC Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.152 Rev 2 & 3: Criteria for Use 
of Computer in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants 
− Template for the Cyber Security Plan Implementation Schedule 
− 10 CFRs: 73.54 & 73.55 & 73.56 
− NEI 10-04 Rev 2: Identifying Systems and Assets Subject to 
the Cyber Security Rules 
− NEI 13-10 Rev 5: Cyber Security Control Assessments 
− NEI 04-04 Rev 1/NEI 08-09 Rev 6: Cyber Security Program 
for Power Reactors 
Finnish YVL-guides by STUK (nuclear regulator) 
− A.3 Leadership and management for safety 
− A.4 Organisation and personnel of a nuclear facility 
− A.5 Construction and commission of a nuclear facility 
− A.11 Security of a nuclear facility 
− A.12 Information security management of a nuclear facility 
− B.1 Safety design of a nuclear power plant 
− B.2 Classification of systems, structures and components of a 
nuclear facility 
− B.7 Provisions for internal and external hazards at a nuclear 
facility 
− C.5 Emergency arrangement of a nuclear power plant 
− E.7 Electrical and I&C equipment of a nuclear facility 
From the compressive list presented above, the most essential 
ones were picked for a closer study. The selection was done 
according to their importance to design of nuclear I&C systems 
from the Finnish perspective, where the major governing guideline 
is the YVL-guide A.12 ‘Information security management of 
nuclear facility’, by Finnish nuclear regulatory authority STUK. 
The standards selected to be reviewed further were IEC 62443 
series, ISO/IEC 27K series, IEC 62645, IEC 62859, and IAEA 
Nuclear Security Series No. 17, additionally the review included 
ISO/IEC 15048 ‘Common Criteria’ series. Fig. 1 depicts these 
standards and roughly their categorisation. Notable, it was 
discovered that each of them have also been used as referenced 
standards while the most recent version YVL-guide A.12 was 
developed (2021 version). 
 
Fig. 1 Most important cybersecurity standards from Finnish 
perspective. 
In the next subchapter, the standards from Fig. 1 are further 
introduced and their requirement topics are presented. 
B. Introduction to selected cybersecurity standards and 
requirements 
IEC 62443-series 
The standard IEC 62443 family is developed continuously. 
Currently published versions can be divided into following 
groups. 
General: General aspects, which are applied throughout the 
standard series. Including: 62443-1-1: Concepts and Models; 
62443-1-2: Master Glossary of Terms and Abbreviations; 62443-
1-3: System Security Conformance Metrics; 62443-1-4: IACS 
Security Lifecycle and Use Cases. 
Policies and procedures: focus on people, organizations and 
processes. Including: 62443-2-1: Security Program Requirements 
for IACS Asset Owners; 62443-2-2: Implementation Guidance for 
an IACS Security Management System; 62443-2-3: Patch 
Management in the IACS Environment; 62443-2-4: Requirements 
for IACS Solution Suppliers; 62443-2-5: Implementation 
Guidance for IACS Asset Owners; 
System: focus on technology aspects of systems. Including: 
62443-3-1: Security Technologies for IACS; 62443-3-2: Security 
Risk Assessment and System Design; 62443-3-3: System Security 
Requirements and Security Levels. 
Component: focus on requirements related to products and 
components. Including: 62443-4-1: Secure Product Development 
Lifecycle Requirements; 62443-4-2: Technical Security 
Requirements for IACS Components. 
IEC 62443 standard introduce the three basic roles that affect 
in protecting industrial facilities from cyberattacks. These roles 
are: Product Supplier, System Integrator and Asset Owner. Each 
of these actors has a unique role to play in the design, 
development, marketing, operation, and maintenance of industrial 
cybersecurity solutions. Some parts of the standard family are 
dedicated to specific role, like asset owner (IEC 62443-2-1 and 
IEC 62443-2-4). [5] 
The security levels defined by the standard represent the 
confidence that a system, zone, and/or its components can provide 
the desired level of security. Security levels are defined according 
to their typology: 
− Target - This is the level of protection to be achieved for each 
area and path using a number of countermeasures (SL-T). This 
is the minimum target for SL-A. See also part 3-2 of the 
standard IEC 62443. 
− Capability - This is the level of protection specific to a 
component or subsystem (i.e. part of conduit or zone) that 
allows the desired level of security to be expected (SL-C). See 
also part 3-3 and part 4-2 of the standard IEC 62443. 
− Achieved: This is the level actually achieved by the intrinsic 
properties of the components that make up a zone or conduit 
and the potential contribution of countermeasures (SL-A). See 
also part 3-2 of the standard IEC 62443. 
Security Level is defined as the measure of confidence that the 
System Under Consideration, Zone, or Conduit is free from 
vulnerabilities and functions in the intended manner [6]. The 
security levels are divided into five levels: 
− SL 0: No special requirement or protection provided. 
− SL 1: Protection against unintentional or accidental misuse. 
− SL 2: Protection against intentional misuse by simple means 
with few resources, general skills and low motivation. 
− SL 3: Protection against intentional misuse by sophisticated 
means with moderate resources, specific knowledge about 
industrial automation and control systems and moderate 
motivation. 
− SL 4: Protection against intentional misuse using sophisticated 
means with extensive resources, specific knowledge about 
industrial automation and control systems and high motivation. 
[7] 
Foundational requirements (FR) are presented at IEC 62443-
4-2, which focuses on components, products and security 
capability requirements (SL-C). The security levels are defined 
also for each foundational requirement (FR) based on their 
criticality within the system. For each foundational requirement 
there can be also component requirements and requirement 
enhancements [5]. The security level (SL-C) for the product is the 
minimum SL achieved over all of these evaluations [7].  
− FR 1, Identification and authentication control, identifies and 
authenticates all users, before granting access into the system. 
− FR 2, User control ensures that users have privileges to 
perform the required actions and monitors them. 
− FR 3, Data integrity ensures the integrity of equipment and 
information in communication channels and storage 
directories. 
− FR 4, Data confidentiality ensures that information flowing 
through communication channels and storage directories is not 
disturbed. 
− FR 5, Restricted data flow segments the system into zones and 
conduits to avoid unnecessary data propagation. 
− FR 6, Timely response to event, responds to security breaches 
with timely reporting and timely decision making. 
− FR 7, Resource availability ensures system and asset 
availability during denial of service attacks. 
The standard IEC 62443 also presents a maturity model. While 
security levels are a measure of the strength of technical 
requirements, the maturity levels are a measure of processes 
(people, policies, and procedures). Parts 2-1, 2-2, 2-4, and 4-1 use 
maturity levels to measure how thoroughly requirements are met. 
The levels from 1 to 4 are initial, managed, defined (practiced) and 
improving. [6] 
Defense of depth strategy is considered good, since attacks 
come from outside, but a perimeter defence is not sufficient. 
Several barriers must be established to reduce the probability of 
bad impact caused by attacker. It means provision of multiple 
security protections, especially in layers with the intent to delay or 
prevent attacks. System security becomes a set of layers within the 
overall network security [8]. The standard defines also concept of 
essential functions that are required to maintain health, safety, 
environment and availability of the equipment under control. Part 
3-3 of the standard IEC 62443 requires that security measures shall 
not adversely affect essential functions of a high-availability IACS 
unless it is supported by a Risk Assessment. [6] 
IEC 62443 (ANSI/ISA-99) introduces the concepts of “zones” 
and “conduits” to segment and isolate the various sub-systems in 
a control system. A zone is defined as a grouping of logical or 
physical assets that share common security requirements based on 
factors such as criticality and consequence. [9] 
ISO 27K-series 
The ISO/IEC 27000-series is a set of information security 
standards, providing best practice recommendations on 
information security at a generic level but also some publications 
in the series dive deeper in specific domains like energy, health, 
financial services, etc. Currently there are 60 different standards 
in the series. 
The goal of the 27k series is to provide a reference to support 
organizations to identify and manage their risks (financial loss, 
physical harm, loss of reputation) and establish a process for 
deploying and updating security controls. This should enable 
stakeholders to achieve and maintain a basic level of security. 
The main topics covered by the ISO 27K series are: 
− Information security: requirements, management systems, risk 
management, governance, controls, incident management 
− Network security: design, threat scenarios, security techniques 
− Application security: management, validation and verification, 
controls 
The key concepts are: 
− Self-assessment of security risks is a good starting point. 
− Security threats are dynamic and evolving, there needs to be a 
continuous effort to update the security controls according to 
the current and foreseeable environment. 
− Establishment of a Plan-Do-Check-Act model implement 
feedback and update mechanisms. 
− Security standards need to be used as references/guidance. 
− The security controls need to be appropriate/proportional to the 
security risk. 
Of special interest is the ISO/IEC 27019 publication which 
focuses on the energy utilities and covers production, 
transmission, storage and distribution. It is based on the ISO/IEC 
27002 and covers areas of: Central and distributed 
programming/automation, Programmable logic controllers, 
sensors and actuators, Data management, Operational Network 
communications, Metering infrastructure, smart energy meters 
and other measurement devices (e.g. for emissions), Digital 
protection and safety systems, Energy management systems, 
Energy grids 
The ISO/IEC 27019 is not applicable to the security of process 
control of nuclear facilities, the standards point to IEC 62645 for 
this purpose. 
IEC 62645-series 
The IEC 62645 standard was first published in 2014 and then 
updated in 2019. It focuses on the cybersecurity of nuclear I&C 
and electrical systems, it is aligned with the ISO/IEC 27001 and it 
is going to be a “parent” for more standards in the topic, like the 
IEC 62859 (coordination between cybersecurity and safety in the 
nuclear domain). The three main sections of the standard cover 
security at programme level, at system level and then specific 
topics related to control/requirement. 
The IEC 62645 introduces cybersecurity concepts such as the 
graded approach (controls should be appropriate to the level of the 
threats) with three security levels – degrees (S1, S2, S3) [10]. The 
function of systems and the impact to safety/security is considered 
to decide the security measures needed to protect them. The 
system lifecycle is considered, security measures are applied 
during also during development and pre-installation phases. 
Systems that are assigned the same security degree should have a 
similar level of security measures regardless of subjective 
parameters (who designed/developed them). The interfaces 
between systems assigned to different security degrees are of 
special interest, restrictions (e.g. hardware-enforced one way 
communication) may be applied. Security measures applied on the 
system to system interfaces should not impact the functionality of 
the system.  
IEC 62859 
IEC 62859 standard is dedicated to managing the interactions 
between safety and cybersecurity, specifically in the nuclear 
domain, taking into account other current SC 45A (IEC nuclear 
I&C subcommittee) standards. It is aimed at bridging IEC 62645 
and IEC 61513 addressing safety-security issues and the specifics 
of nuclear I&C programmable digital systems (both important to 
safety and not important to safety). It is intended to be used in the 
design of new systems and in modernizing the existing ones when 
safety and cybersecurity provisions converge on the same I&C 
systems or architectures. Similarly to IEC 62645, it only concerns 
cybersecurity challenges caused by malicious acts perpetrated by 
digital means (cyberattacks).  
According to the standard, cybersecurity shall not restrict or 
interfere with safety objectives or performance. It intends to 
establish requirements and guidance to: 
− Integrating cybersecurity provisions in nuclear overall I&C 
architectures and systems fundamentally tailored for safety 
− Avoiding potential conflicts between safety and cybersecurity 
in system, organizational and operational level 
− Help the identification and taking advantage of the possible 
synergies between safety and cybersecurity 
At the architectural level the standards sets the following 
fundamental and generic principles: 
− Cybersecurity shall not interface with the safety objectives of 
the plant and shall protect their realization. Effectiveness of the 
diversity and defence-in-depth features shall not be 
compromised. 
− Cybersecurity requirements impacting the overall I&C 
architecture shall be addressed after the design and assessment 
of I&C functions have been made. 
− Cybersecurity features shall not negatively impact required 
performance, effectiveness, reliability or operation of functions 
important to safety. 
− The failure modes and consequences of cybersecurity features 
on the functions important to safety shall be analysed. 
− Between equivalently safe architecture designs, the most 
secure one should be prioritized. However, still avoiding 
unnecessary complexity. 
− If any architectural property or characteristics designed for 
safety has value as a potential cybersecurity counter-measure, 
it should be re-examined to confirm its cybersecurity 
effectiveness. 
IAEA NSS 17 
Most prominent international guidance comes for IAEA. 
Mainly through its Nuclear Security Programme, in which the 
IAEA supports establishing, maintaining, and sustaining a nuclear 
security regime. The series comprises of fundamentals, 
recommendations, implementing guides and technical guidance. 
IAEA categorises overall security to site, personnel, information, 
computer, and physical security. These disciplines of security 
interact and complement each other to establish a plant’s security 
posture. Failure in any of these disciplines of security can affect 
the other domains and cause extra requirements on the remaining 
aspects. 
The computer security at nuclear facilities reference manual 
[11] gives guidelines especially to management. Security 
management lifecycles model describes the security management 
tasks and it emphasizes continuous improvements. The difference 
between information technology systems and industrial control 
systems is pointed out and different cybersecurity requirements 
are needed for them. Security levels are described in the manual 
and they define the degrees of security protection required by 
various computer systems in a facility. The security levels differ 
from IEC 62443 security levels (SL). Unlike in IEC 62443 series, 
the security level 1 has the strictest rules and rules become lower 
up to security level 5. Generic security level is required from all 
computers. The security levels of the reference manual are 
associated to required safety of the computer system. For example, 
security level 1 is required from protective circuits and security 
level 5 from office automation systems, which have low severity 
level for various cyber threats. This kind of classification gives an 
overview of potential combined safety and cybersecurity severity, 
without going deep in security details. 
The reference manual shows list of threats, which are 
associated to individual attackers or organizations. Also, the list of 
vulnerabilities is associated to human mistakes.  
ISO/IEC 15048 ‘Common Criteria’ 
The Common Criteria for Information Technology Security 
Evaluation (CC) is an international standard (ISO/IEC 15408) for 
computer security certification. Its current version is 3.1 revision 
5. [12] 
The Common Criteria (CC) was developed to facilitate 
consistent evaluations of security products and systems. The 
theory behind CC, is that CC will advance the state of security by 
encouraging various parties to write Protection Profiles (PPs) 
outlining their needs and desires, and this will push vendors to 
meet the resulting Protection Profiles and make claims about the 
security attributes of their products. Independent certified 
laboratories evaluate the products to determine if they actually 
meet the claims. [13] 
In other words, CC provides assurance that the process of 
specification, implementation and evaluation of an IT security 
product has been conducted in a rigorous and standard and 
repeatable manner at a level that is commensurate with the target 
environment for use. The certification of evaluation results can 
provide a sound basis for confidences that security measures are 
appropriate to meet a given threat, and they are correctly 
implemented. However, it is not an absolute guarantee of security. 
[13] 
CC maintains a list of certified products, including operating 
systems, access control systems, databases, and key management 
systems [14]. 
Key concepts of CC are: 
− Target of Evaluation (TOE) is the product or system that is the 
subject of the evaluation. The evaluation serves to validate 
claims made about the target’s security. 
− Protection Profile (PP) is a document, typically created by a 
user or user community, which identifies security requirements 
for a class of security devices relevant to that user for a 
particular purpose.  
− Security Target (ST) is the document that identifies the security 
properties of the target of evaluation. The ST may claim 
conformance with one or more PPs. 
− Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) specify individual 
security functions which may be provided by a product. The 
Common Criteria presents a standard catalogue of such 
functions. 
− Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) are descriptions of 
the measures taken during development and evaluation of the 
product to assure compliance with the claimed security 
functionality. 
− Evaluation Assurance Level (EAL) is the numerical rating 
describing the depth and rigor of an evaluation. Common 
Criteria lists seven levels, with EAL 1 being the most and EAL 
7 being the most stringent. Higher EALs do not necessarily 
imply better security, they only mean that the claimed security 
assurance of the TOE has been more extensively verified. 
The CC documents are [12]: 
− Part 1 - Introduction and General Model: This part defines 
general concepts and principles of IT security evaluation and 
presents a general model of evaluation. 
− Part 2 - Security Functional Requirements: This part 
establishes a set of security functional components as a 
standard way of expressing the security requirements for IT 
products and systems. 
− Part 3 - Security Assurance Requirements: This part presents 
establishes set of assurance components that can be used as a 
standard way of expressing the assurance requirements for IT 
products and systems. Part 3 defines evaluation criteria for 
Protection Profiles (PPs) and Security Targets (STs). Part 3 
also presents the seven Evaluation Assurance Levels (EALs), 
which are predefined packages of assurance components that 
make up the CC scale for rating confidence in the security of 
IT products and systems. 
The application of CC in nuclear industry is discussed, for 
example, in [15] and [16]. The author of [15] lists key advantages 
of the use of CC in nuclear industry: 
− The CC is the only well established and internationally 
recognized standard for IT product security evaluation and 
there is tremendous value in the worldwide network of 
certification schemes and accredited labs that can be used for 
security evaluations. 
− The CC provides a flexible but structured framework that can 
be customized and adopted for a variety of industry vertical use 
cases, threat models and assurance levels. 
− To get real value from CC, industry participants must 
collaborate to create tailored requirements to address the 
specific needs of nuclear industry. For example, nuclear 
industry can establish relevant technical communities that are 
focused on sharing threat intelligence and specifying security 
requirements, both functional and across the product life cycle, 
for technologies that are critical to your industry via relevant 
protection profiles and security targets. 
− The CC allow for scaling of device testing thanks to use to 
standardized and automated test, which in turn leads to 
demonstrable reduction of time, cost and reduction of risk. 
Son et al. [16], on the other hand, discusses common points of 
various cyber security schemes used in nuclear industry. The CC 
is one of the analysed cyber security schemes. The authors 
recognize a few additional advantages of CC schemes. Namely, 
the CC schemes additionally require that devices undergo: 1) 
Periodic vulnerability analysis 2) Penetrating testing 3) Patch 
update against recently effective cyber-attacks 4) Cryptographic 
module validation 5) Secure coding, and 6) Security suitability. 
The first, second and the third points are elements that should be 
considered in light of ever-evolving cyber-attacks. Vulnerabilities 
could always be discovered and exploited. Thus, for example, as 
the CC receives an assessment, it sets a maximum certification 
period, and when the term expires, re-certification should be 
performed for cyber security. The fourth point states that the 
cryptographic module implemented for the security function 
should be verified according to the methods of Cryptographic 
Module Validation Program (In FIPS 140-2, Security 
Requirements for Cryptographic Modules by NIST). The fifth 
points is a scheme that analyses whether the developed codes are 
implemented in compliance with the recommended secure coding 
guidelines. The sixth point is requirement to analyse the suitability 
of security functions and products for a given application. Finally, 
the authors propose a nuclear cyber security evaluation system 
with reference to a CC assessment system. 
A.12 – Information security management of nuclear facility 
Relevant YVL guides to cybersecurity are A.12 (Information 
security management of nuclear facility) and A.11 (Security of 
nuclear facility), which together with The Nuclear Energy Act 
(990/1987) and the Government Decrees on Security in the Use of 
Nuclear Energy (734/2008) form the basis for security 
arrangements in Finnish nuclear facilities. A.11 focuses more on 
the physical security of the plant but brings up important concepts 
such as security zones. Some additional requirements are also 
given in guides B.1 (Safety design of a nuclear power plant) and 
E.7 (Electrical and I&C equipment of a nuclear facility). Guides 
give picture of the overall implementation of nuclear security 
consisting of several actions and systems.  
Guide YVL A.12 is from Finnish perspective the most 
important cybersecurity guideline. The guide sets out 
requirements for the management of information security at a 
nuclear facility in all stages of its lifecycle. The main topics the 
guide addresses are related to information security management, 
protecting information, managing resources (sufficiency, 
competence, training, expertise), protecting system that are 
important to safety and security (separation, data transfer 
limitation, however YVL A.12 doesn’t directly required 
information security zones, as NSS-17 does, for example), access 
control and security testing. In the explanatory memorandum it 
mentions the most significant references to be the IAEA NSS 17, 
the ISO/IEC 27000 series, and the IEC 62443 series. Other 
noteworthy being IEC 62645 and IEC 62859. 
III. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Increased level of automation, gained by more sophisticated 
algorithms for control and data analysis, brings increasing 
complexity and introduction of a new cybersecurity risk for the 
systems and the plant at whole. In general, synthesis for I&C 
architecture requirements during design stage is still an open issue. 
This paper surveyed the cybersecurity standards for nuclear I&C 
from Finnish perspective. However, the list of standards 
introduced are expected to cover the landscape of nuclear I&C 
builds quite generally in other countries too. The list is long, as 
many different organisation progress the cybersecurity domain 
with their efforts. We considered the most significant standards to 
be IEC 62443 series, ISO 27K series, IEC 62645, IEC 62859 and 
IAEA’s NSS 17, in addition we reviewed ISO/IEC 15048 and 
Finnish cybersecurity YVL-guide A.12. 
The work also included discussion with Finnish nuclear 
stakeholders. The main comments from the industry were such 
that from the designers/licence holders’ point-of-view the 
standards are not detailed enough, or too ambiguous, and it is often 
unclear how the security requirements are meant to be fulfilled. 
When the list of current cybersecurity standards were gathered for 
the paper; it was noticed, that more related standards are being 
prepared to fulfil gaps and integrate different security design 
components together to form more overarching approach to 
security architecture design, similar to quite matured safety 
standardisation. 
Many safety related requirements turn easily into security 
requirements and vice versa, at least when software is considered. 
For example, in YVL B.1, there is requirement that states that ‘no 
single common cause failure (CCF) of any individual component 
type shall prevent the nuclear power plant from being brought to 
a controlled or safe state’, in a broad sense all software in the plant 
can be considered as a single component and thus designers need 
to consider a situation were all software is lost to a CFF, for 
example because of a cyberattack. As a future research, the next 
steps will focus on categorisation of the cybersecurity standards 
and the safety – security interplay [17], which is approached 
already promisingly in the standard IEC 62859. 
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